The Doctrine of Insurable Interest in Illinois as Applied to Life Insurance by Collins, Eric
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 2
June 1931
The Doctrine of Insurable Interest in Illinois as
Applied to Life Insurance
Eric Collins
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric Collins, The Doctrine of Insurable Interest in Illinois as Applied to Life Insurance, 9 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 160 (1931).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol9/iss3/2
THE DOCTRINE OF INSURABLE INTEREST IN
ILLINOIS AS APPLIED TO LIFE INSURANCE
EMuo COLLINs'
A T early common law an insurable interest was
unnecessary under any circumstances, all contracts
of insurance being enforceable at law. The insurer might
have a remedy in an action in a Court of Chancery but
only when the circumstances surrounding the contract
were of such an unconscionable nature that a manifest
injustice would result from an enforcement of the con-
tract. The remedy in such a case would be a delivering
up of the policy to the insurer, the suit being brought on
an application to have the policy so delivered up.
Historically, the doctrine of insurable interest finds its
inception in the rise of maritime insurance, the fore-
runner of all other forms of insurance. The history of
maritime insurance shows that it is essentially an
indemnification against loss, a means by which the indi-
vidual, for a consideration, might divide up the risk of
loss of his goods while in course of transportation across
the seas. There was never, originally, any question of
gain involved in the contract; it was solely and exclu-
sively an indemnity against a possible loss.
From this question of an indemnity against loss the
doctrine of insurable interest arose, as the courts early
recognized the fact that there could not be an indemnity
without a loss, or a loss without an interest. 2 However,
before the recognition of the necessity of an interest
vested in the insured, in the subject matter of the indem-
nity contract became apparent, these contracts came to
be utilized in a manner not contemplated by the origi-
nators of such contracts and contrary to the true prin-
ciples of insurance. Under the meager requirements of
I Associated with National Life Ins. Co. of U. S. A.
2 Pritchet v. Insurance Co. of North America, 8 Pa. 458.
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the common law regarding indemnity contracts people
were entering into such contracts with regard to all man-
ner of goods in which, in the majority of cases, they had
no interest whatsoever, the abuses of the indemnity con-
tract finally becoming sufficiently serious to necessitate
corrective legislation.
This legislation was enacted in the reign of George II
in England in the year 1748,3 the statute reciting the
mischiefs and inconveniences of the current method of
permitting insurance contracts to be made without in-
quiry as to the existence of an insurable interest in the
person insured and being designed to restore the original
principles of insurance contracts which under the later
common law had deteriorated, in a large measure, into
mere wagering contracts. With the rise of life insur-
ance it was found that persons having no interest in
the life of the insured were securing contracts with the
insurers with growing frequency, resulting in similar
mischiefs and inconveniences as had arisen under the
marine insurance laws, or rather lack of laws. These
mischiefs also were eventually regulated by statute in
the reign of George III in the year 1774.4 This statute,
the first statutory recognition of the necessity of an
insurable interest in life insurance, and the basis of the
doctrine, reads as follows:
I. Whereas it has been found by experience, that the making
of insurance on lives, or other events, wherein the assured shall
have no interest, hath introduced a mischievous kind of gaming:
For remedy whereof, be it enacted by the Kings most excellent
majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiri-
tual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, that from and
after the passing of this act, no insurance shall be made by any
person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, on the life or
lives of any person or persons, or on any other event or events
whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for whose use,
benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies shall be
3 19 Geo. II, c. 37.
4 14 Geo. III, e. 48.
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made, shall have no interest or by way of gaming or wagering;
and that every assurance made contrary to the true intent and
meaning hereof, shall be null and void, to all intents and pur-
poses whatsoever.
II. And be it further enacted, that it shall not be lawful to
make any policy or policies on the life or lives of any person
or persons, or other event or events, without inserting in such
policy or policies the person or persons, name or names interested
therein, or for whose use, benefit or on whose account, such
policy is so made or underwrote.
III. And be it further enacted, that in all cases where the
insured hath interest in such life or lives, event or events, no
greater sum shall be recovered or received from the insurer or
insurers than the amount or value of the interest of the insured
in such life or lives, or other event or events.
IV. Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall
extend, or be construed to extend, to insurances bona fide made
by any person or persons, on ships, goods, or merchandise; but
every such insurance shall be as valid and effectual in the law,
as if this act had not been made.
In a sense, there was nothing new to the doctrine of
insurable interest declared by this statute, as it was in
reality only a re-establishment of the old common law
principles which had fallen into disuse, but the statute
itself marks the turning point historically from which
the rise of the doctrine may be considered.
The sound doctrines of the old English common law
were made the basis of the legal system of the newly
created United States of America, and of the several
states themselves upon entering into the Union.
The State of Illinois in common with the several states
adopted the common law rules in the same manner in
which they had been adopted by the national legislature,
and with them adopted the original provision with re-
gard to the doctrine of insurable interest, on which the
modern Illinois doctrine is based.
The modern doctrine is not a creature of statute how-
ever, the statutes of this state being curiously silent upon
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the subject, and it is for this reason that the common
law rule takes on significance, the Illinois doctrine fol-
lowing that of the common law, except where the latter
has been abrogated by statute. The basis of the modern
doctrine is the common law doctrine as originally ex-
pressed and reiterated by the statute of George III,
amplified and expanded by the judicial decisions of the
Illinois Supreme Court in the various cases which have
come before it for adjudication.
In Illinois today a contract of insurance is held to be
a contract of indemnity 5 which is a virtual affirmation
of the common law rule, and the Supreme Court of this
state has constantly upheld this contention, even in the
face of contrary expressions of opinion from the deci-
sions of other states, where the courts have been unable
to overcome the inherent difficulty presented by the prac-
tical impossibility of determining the value of a human
life, and of answering the equally troublesome question
of when and under what circumstances one person will
sustain a loss by reason of the death of or injury to
another. Cooley, in his text,6 has pointed out that "if
a contract of life insurance is not one of indemnity there
would seem to be no reason for requiring an insurable
interest in the life insured to support the policy in the
absence of statutory provisions," which would seem to
uphold and justify the rule as expressed in this state as
being both sound as to the common law doctrine and
sound as to the better modern opinion, as the necessity
of an insurable interest is today everywhere admitted.
There is, however, a great deal of authority in other
states, as has already been suggested, which upholds a
view contrary to that established in this state with refer-
ence to the question of indemnity, and consequently, the
question being in dispute, it would be advisable to give
it further consideration at this time. As regards the
relationship of debtor and creditor, the latter is held to
have an insurable interest in the life of the former at
5 Healey v. Mutual Accident Ass'n, 133 Ill. 556.
61 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2nd Ed.), p. 127.
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least up to the amount of his debt, which is unquestion-
ably a contract of indemnity, pure and simple. However,
in the family relationships, particularly those where the
insurable interest is based solely upon an assumed love
and affection, the proposition becomes involved and con-
fusing, because of the absolute impossibility of determin-
ing the sum which would indemnify, for example, a wife
for the loss of her husband's society, comfort and pro-
tection. In such a case there is a valid contract of life
insurance granted to a person having a recognized but
unascertainable interest in the life insured, who stands
to lose an equally unascertainable and indefinable some-
thing upon the extinguishing of such life. Can the insur-
ance contract in such case be considered a contract of
indemnity? Or is it merely a contract to compensate the
wife in some measure for a loss for which the compensa-
tion received is totally inadequate?
The relation of employer and employee affords a tran-
sitional relation between the two preceding relationships,
as in some instances the exact worth of the latter to the
former may be determined, and an insurance policy
issued which is clearly an indemnity contract, while in
other instances the value of the employee to the corpo-
ration or of a partner to a firm, which is a similar rela-
tion, may not be ascertainable or susceptible of a mone-
tary value. However, inasmuch as it becomes an
indemnity contract under some circumstances and under
others a contract which requires a great stretch of the
imagination to be considered as one of indemnity, it adds
to, rather than alleviates the confusion. For a final de-
termination the matter must be left to the supreme
tribunal of each state and of the United States, and as
it is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is
inevitable that the decisions in the various courts of last
resort should be in conflict.
As previously stated, Illinois requires an insurable
interest in every contract of life insurance, a proper
compliance with this requirement being essential to every
valid life insurance contract. The difficulty rests in the
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interpretation of the questions as to what constitutes
an insurable interests and in whom does such an interest
rest in any given contract for life insurance. These
questions are, of necessity, in the countless variety of
circumstances which may arise, susceptible of innumer-
able answers, varying according to the circumstances
surrounding each contract, and in order to ascertain the
nature of the answers as they have been enunciated by
the Illinois Supreme Court, it will be necessary to take
up each different set of circumstances in detail.
Before attempting to discuss the more intricate prob-
lems presented by this subject, it would be advisable to
dispose of the question of the insured himself and his
rights with regard to the contract of life insurance and
the necessity of an insurable interest in any beneficiary
named by him in such contract.
The general doctrine in Illinois is that every person
has an insurable interest in his or her own life and may
procure a contract of life insurance on his or her own
life without question, as there can be no doubt of an
insurable interest where the insured himself is the party
in interest. The proposition, however, has been carried
further, and it has been held and is now the law that
a person taking out insurance on his own life may take
it out for the benefit of another having no insurable
interest therein,7 a statement which has been qualified
in some cases by the phrase, "Where the rules of the
company permit.""
In general, it is a question of public policy which makes
an insurable interest necessary in every contract of life
insurance, such insurable interest to be present in the
person who applies for the issuance of the policy, or at
whose instigation and request the application is made.
The question of public policy arises out of the fact that
where there is no insurable interest present in the person
requesting insurance on the life of another the contract
7 Bloomington Benefit Ass'n v. Blue, 120 Ill. 121, approved in Stake
v. Stake, 228 Ill. 630; Colegrove v. Lowe, 343 Ill. 360.
S Johnson v. Van Epps, 110 Il1. 551.
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becomes a mere wager, and as such, void at its inception, 9
because where there was no interest either pecuniary or
of blood, in the continued existence of the person whose
life was insured, the contract was a mere gamble as to
how long the insured would live, with the added incen-
tive to the person paying premiums to dispose of the
insured if the wager should at any time appear to be
going against him. There is no question in the mind of
anyone but that such contracts are contrary to public
policy and that the courts are justified in holding them
to be void at their inception, the real difficulty arising
only when attempting to determine whether there is an
actual blood interest or pecuniary interest in the person
to whom the insurance was granted.
Where an insurance policy is actually issued, whether
at the instigation of the beneficiary or not, assuming the
beneficiary to have an insurable interest in the life in-
sured, and subsequently the beneficiary murders the
insured or is instrumental in bringing about his death,
the beneficiary cannot recover the proceeds of the policy,
even where there was no intention to realize the benefit
at the time the act was committed. 10 The case in which
the foregoing decision was given was one involving a
benefit certificate, and the case further held that despite
the fact that the beneficiary was not entitled to the pro-
ceeds of the policy, the insurer was not relieved from
paying the claim. It is reasonable to suppose that the
decision would be the same in the case of an old line life
insurance contract, although the question has never
arisen in this state, as the insurer has received every-
thing to which it was entitled under the contract and
consequently should be compelled to perform its part of
the contract upon receipt of due proofs of the insured's
death, particularly where the insured himself has been
paying the premium. The payment of the proceeds in
such a case would properly be made to the insured's
estate.
9 Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; Hawley v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 291 Il. 28.
10 Schreiner v. High Court I. C. 0. of F., 35 Ill. App. 576.
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The cases where the courts have held blood interests,
with which are associated affinity interests, to be sufficient
to support a contract of life insurance are surprisingly
few, the majority of the circumstances which have been
held to create a valid insurable interest arising out of
the family, as for instance a wife is always held to have
an insurable interest in the life of her husband." This
rule is based upon two very sound principles which the
courts recognize as being amply sufficient to create an
insurable interest, the first being a natural fondness of
the wife for the husband sufficient of itself to negative
any criminal intent, the second being an expectation of
support and pecuniary gain to be derived from a con-
tinuance of the husband's life. So far, this particular
proposition appears to be perfectly sound and the au-
thorities to be standing on firm ground, but it has been
held that where a woman who is the beneficiary under a
policy has been misdescribed as the insured's wife when
in fact she was not his lawful wife, although acting in
good faith under the belief that they were legally mar-
ried, she has an insurable interest in the life of the
insured.12 This decision seems to be carrying the propo-
sition to an extreme which is unjustified, the decision ap-
parently being based upon a presumption of lawfulness
in that the woman bona fide believed herself to be the
insured's wife. However, the weakness of that conten-
tion lies in the fact that the presumption creating the
interest is based upon the bona fide belief in the exist-
ence of a marital status in the particular case, a belief
which is itself difficult of any preponderance of proof.
With regard to the existence of an insurable interest
in a child in the life of its father, it would appear that
the mere relationship of itself does not create an interest,
but that there must be present a reasonable expectation
of pecuniary gain or benefit from the continuance of
the father's life or a detriment to be suffered upon his
11 People, etc. for use of Schuchert v. Phelps, Admx., 78 I1. 147;
Pingree et al. v. Jones, 80 Ill. 177.
12 Columbian Circle v. Auslander, 302 Ill. 603; Burr v. Royal League,
193 Ill. App. 238.
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death. The case of Guardian Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Hogan,13 which is authority for the preced-
ing statement also holds that where a son works for his
father without compensation after attaining his major-
ity, making improvements on the father's land, evidence
of these facts while admissible to help establish an
insurable interest are not conclusive of the point.
As the case just cited holds that as between a son and
a father the mere relationship of itself does not give
the former an insurable interest in the life of the latter,
there can be no question that a step-child, or an adopted
child, would not be in any better position, and conse-
quently would have to show a pecuniary interest in the
life of the parent in order to establish an insurable in-
terest which would support a contract of life insurance.
There is a single case in Illinois holding that a step-
child has no insurable interest in the life of a step-
parent, 14 but this case is not in point with the present
discussion because the contract involved is a benefit cer-
tificate, in which the class of beneficiaries designated was
construed not to include step-children. Consequently as
a general rule, it is unquestionably safe to say that
wherever children are concerned an insurable interest
may be established by showing a reasonable expectation
of pecuniary gain from the continuance of the parent's
life or a detriment to be suffered upon the parent's death
as held in the case of Guardianz Mu'ual Life Insurance
Company v. Hogan,15 which is synonymous with the fami-
liar doctrine of dependence and support. The question
of the existence of an insurable interest in illegitimate
children has never been decided in Illinois and therefore
any attempt to outline the probable policy which our
courts will adopt when this matter is presented to them
for adjudication must of necessity be based largely upon
conjecture, but as the fundamental principles of the doc-
trine with reference to other relationships are firmly
13 80 Il. 35. See also Chicago Guaranty Fund Life Society v. Dyon,
79 Ill. App. 100.
14 Ptacek v. Pisa, 231 I1. 522.
15 80 Ill. 35.
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established and the decisions handed down are consistent,
it is only reasonable to presume that an illegitimate
child would have an insurable interest in the life of either
of its parents upon showing a benefit to be gained or a
loss to be suffered from a continuation or extinction
of the life insured. There is a Federal case holding that
an illegitimate child has an insurable interest in the life
of its parents, 6 but it is probable that the Illinois courts
would only follow this decision where a definite pecu-
niary interest is established as is required in the case of
other classes of children.
Concerning the question of a parent's interest in the
life of a child the courts are practically silent as the point
does not appear to have been raised in this state up to
the present time, with the exception of a single case,
which holds that a mother has an insurable interest in
the life of a minor son. 17 The decision in this case was
apparently induced by a consideration of the natural
affection of the mother for the child which would be suffi-
cient to take this particular case out of the class of those
which would be contrary to public policy as being con-
ducive to crime. This case appears to be founded on
sound principles of insurance law and to follow the gen-
eral trend of the decisions which have formulated the
modern laws with regard to the subject of insurable in-
terest, and that being the case, it seems reasonable to
suppose that a similar decision would be reached with
regard to the existence of an insurable interest in a
father in the life of a minor son and of the existence of
an insurable interest in either a father or mother in the
life of a minor daughter. Had the question of an insur-
able interest in a parent in the life of a minor child arisen
at common law, it is reasonable to suppose that those
same keen-minded, common-sense men who laid down
and formulated the basic principles of the common law
as it exists today, would have decided that such an in-
terest existed, especially when it is remembered that
16 In Re Cohen, 230 Fed. 733.
17 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Quandt, 69 Ill. App. 649.
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under the common law the parent was entitled to the
earnings of a minor child. No other decision seems pos-
sible in the face of the strongest blood interests coupled
with a pecuniary interest founded in the law itself.
The existence of an insurable interest of one child
in the life of his or her sister or brother does not appear
to have been determined by our courts, but the inference
to be drawn from the relationship of father and child,
as previously outlined, would seem to suggest that in
such cases the mere relationship of itself would not be
sufficient to establish such an interest. It should also
follow from the same reasoning that where a pecuniary
interest existed between two such children, the possessor
of the pecuniary interest should have an insurable in-
terest in the life of the other. One authority in treating
this subject calls attention to the doctrine established
in the Massachusetts courts which hold that an unmar-
ried sister has an insurable interest in the life of a
brother who is supporting her.' 8
A decision which is clearly based upon the existence
of a prior pecuniary interest and consequently squarely
in point with the established doctrine regarding father
and son as determined by the cases of Chicago Guaranty
Fund Life Society v. Dyon'9 and Guardian Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hogan.20  The federal courts have carried
this proposition a great deal further than the New York
courts, however, as there is a Federal case holding that
a sister has an insurable interest in the life of a brother
even after her marriage, although not dependent upon
nor a creditor of the brother,21 which seems to be too
great a divergence from the strict requirements now in
force, ever to find a counterpart in this state. There have
been a few cases 22 in Illinois where the insurable interest
18 Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115.
19 79 Ill. App. 100.
20 80 Ill. 35.
21 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, Fed. Cas. No. 5027, affm'd in 94 U. S.
287.
22 National Union v. Keefe et al., 172 111. App. 101; Norwegian 0. P.
Home Society v. Wilson, 176 Ill. 94.
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of a brother in a life insurance contract has been deter-
mined, but these are of little or no use in determining
a regular practice to be followed, as they deal exclusively
with benefit certificates, the right of the brother to the
proceeds of the certificate being contested upon the
ground that it was ultra vires the societies concerned to
permit a brother to be named as beneficiary.
There is one further relationship which properly be-
longs under the problems of the immediate family. This
is the question of the rights of husband and wife to an
insurable interest in each other's lives as affected by a
subsequent divorce. The general doctrine in such cases
appears to be that the insurable interest remains un-
changed where a policy has been issued prior to the
divorce, 23 but that there will be a cessation of such in-
terest with regard to policies issued subsequent to the
divorce, except in the single instance where there is a
provision in the decree of the court for the payment of
alimony by the husband to the wife. In such case it is
held that the wife has an insurable interest in the life
of the husband which will continue for a period at least
equivalent to the length of time over which the alimony
provided by the decree is payable. 24 Here again the deci-
sion is based upon the existence of a pecuniary interest
of the wife in the continued existence of the husband.
The case of Begley v. Miller, which is authority for the
preceding statement also affirms the case of Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, with regard to
the rights of a divorced wife in her husband's policy,
wherein she is named as beneficiary, the court saying,
"the decree of divorce in no way affected the rights of
the divorced wife in the policy as the beneficiary named
in it, or her authority to demand and receive the amount
payable in virtue of its terms."
The law regarding the more distant relations of blood
and affinity is only partially determined, but the gen-
eral doctrine would again seem to be based upon the
23 The Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 251.
24 Begley v. Miller, 137 Inl. App. 278.
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existence of a pecuniary inter~est moving from the life
insured to the distant relative procuring the insurance.
One of the few cases which has been determined in this
state is that of Bruce et al. v. Illinois Bankers Life Asso-
ciation,25 which was a case wherein the insured's
nephews advanced money to him to cover the payment
of premiums, subsequent to the issuance of the policy,
upon the consideration that a change of beneficiary should
be made to the nephews. The court held in this case
that such a. change of beneficiary made at the request of
the insured was not contrary to public policy and con-
sequently was a valid and enforceable agreement. This
case, however, does not go very far toward establishing
anything of particular value for guidance in future
cases, because the facts were too overwhelmingly one-
sided to have sustained a contrary opinion, inasmuch
as there was an undoubted pecuniary interest present
in the nephews which was strengthened by the fact that
the policy had already been bona fide issued to the in-
sured himself prior to the disputed change of beneficiary,
and the change of beneficiary made at the instance and
request of the insured.
There do not appear to be any other cases in this state
which have any bearing on the matter of the possession
of an insurable interest in distant relatives, but there
are a number of cases deciding questions of an analogous
character. These cases establish general rules that are
controlling under certain specific circumstances which
have arisen and are the leading authorities in Illinois for
the doctrines advanced by them. First, there is the lead-
ing case of Hawley v. Aetna Life Insuramce Co.,26 which
reaffirms the decision in Guardian Mutual Insuravce Co.
v. Hogan2 7 and holds that one having no insurable in-
terest in a life may not procure a valid contract of
insurance on such a life, such contract being void at its
inception. This is fundamental and needs no further
25 207 Ill. App. 555.
26 291 Ill. 28.
27 80 IMI. 35.
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comment. Then there is the ease of Bloomington Benefit
Association v. Blue,28 which establishes the converse of
the last proposition, that is, that one may insure one's
own life for the benefit of another who has no insurable
interest therein, this case being approved by the court
in Stake v. Stake.2" Here, of course, the insurance is
applied for by the insurer himself, the premiums payable
under the contract being paid by him, the beneficiary
having no interest in the policy other than to receive
the amount payable under the terms of the contract upon
its becoming a claim by reason of the insured's death.
The case of Dresen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 30 is authority for three propositions regarding the
question of insurable interest, the first holding that the
payment of the first premium by the insured before deliv-
ery of the policy to the beneficiary named thereon, who in
the contemplation of the parties is to make all subsequent
premium payments, will not cure a lack of insurable
interest which has existed in such beneficiary up to that
time. The second proposition holds that a statement
made in the application for a policy to the effect that the
beneficiary is contributing to the insured's support, is
not sufficient to create an insurable interest where it
otherwise would not exist. The third holds that where
payments of premiums are made by a beneficiary who
has no insurable interest, the beneficiary will be con-
strued to be the agent of the insured and consequently
would not be entitled to a refund of the premiums so
paid 1
As far as the question of assignments is concerned
under the doctrine of insurable interest, there is no
change from the general rule which has already been dis-
cussed. The case of Peoria Life Association v. Hines32
28 120 Ill. 121.
29 228 Il. 630.
30195 Ili. App. 292.
31 But see Middeke v. Balder, 198 Inl. 590, where it was held that a
beneficiary, ineligible by the rules of a benefit society, but who has
paid premiums under the contract in good faith, can recover the pro-
ceeds of the benefit certificate in a court of equity.
32 132 Ill. App. 642.
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clearly establishes the principle that a policy cannot be
assigned to one not possessing an insurable interest, at
the same time holding that a creditor has an insurable
interest in the life of his debtor and consequently may
be the recipient of a valid assignment. The doctrine of
this case is supported by the older case of Guardian
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hogan,33 which holds that
a mere moral claim does not give a creditor an insurable
interest in the life of his debtor, the doctrine of insurable
interest requiring a valid legal claim to support the cred-
itor's right, with the further provision that a properly
established legal claim will only be sufficient where the
amount of insurance procured on the debtor's life shall
not be grossly in excess of such claim.
The two cases cited in the preceding paragraph are in
a measure sustained by the case of Martin v. Stubbings, 34
which was a suit on an insurance policy arising out of
the assignment of such policy to the plaintiff to secure
a debt due upon the winding up of the affairs of a certain
partnership. The debt was evidenced by a note and
secured by the assignment of the life insurance policy
in suit, the consideration for the note and assignment
being the debt itself and a collateral agreement to enter
into a new partnership. The court in its decision held
that the consideration was sufficient to support the as-
signment and gave judgment in favor of the assignee.
The important part of this opinion and the part which
places the case squarely alongside of the cases of the
Peoria Life Insurance Co. v. Hines and Guardian Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hogan, is the decision that there
was a sufficient consideration in this case to support the
disputed assignment, from which it may be deduced that
had there not been a sufficient consideration, which is
synonymous in this case with insurable interest, the
assignment would not have been upheld.
This same case of Martin v. Stubbings is also author-
ity for the proposition that a person having once pro-
33 80 Ill. 35.
34 126 Ill. 387, approved in Stake v. Stake, 228 Ill. 630.
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cured a valid insurance on his own life may make an
assignment of the policy so procured to a third person
who has no insurable interest whatsoever in the life of
the assignor. This proposition appears at first sight to
be in conflict with the portion of the opinion cited in the
preceding paragraph, but the two portions of the opinion
may readily be reconciled when it is understood that
the latter portion refers to the assignment of a valid
policy already in existence to a third person in whom
an insurable interest in the assignor is missing. The
doctrine here advanced is analogous to the decision
handed down in the case of Bloomington Benefit Asso-
ciation v. Blue,35 holding that one may insure one's own
life for the benefit of another having no insurable in-
terest therein, and consequently in accord with the
general rule that a person once having obtained a policy
on his own life on which he is personally fulfilling the
contractual obligations, he may do with it as he pleases,
within the four corners of the contract.
The case of Wohlberg v. Merchants Reserve Life In-
surance Company36 is in accord with the latter portion
of the decision in the case of Martin v. Stubbings, and
forms a connecting link between that case and the case
of Bloomington Benefit Association v. Blue, the court
holding that where the insured takes out an insurance
policy on his own life and pays the premiums himself,
it is immaterial whether the beneficiary is a creditor of
the insured or not, as such beneficiary can recover the
proceeds without previously establishing the existence
of an insurable interest in himself.
The basis of the decision with regard to assignments
of life insurance policies as security, to creditors of the
insured, rests on two fundamental principles, first that
the policy must be originally taken out in good faith by
the parties procuring the assignment, and second, that
the assignment is made with the consent of all parties.
Under these circumstances and where both of these con-
35 120 I1. 121.
36 209 I1. App. 176.
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ditions are satisfied the courts of this state will hold the
assignment to be valid and enforceable. While on the
subject of consent, there is a decision which is still in
force in this state which holds that a policy of life insur-
ance cannot be assigned without obtaining the consent
of the insurance company through which the policy was
issued.3 7
Apparently the amount of the debt owing from the
insured to the creditor or the specific nature of such
debt has no bearing upon the court's decision, as it has
been held in the case of Chicago Title and Trust Co. v.
Haxtun,as that a debt which is barred by the Statute of
Limitations is sufficient to vest an insurable interest in
the creditor, presumably upon the ground that the debt
may still be revived at law by a new promise to pay or by
a partial payment on account. The statement that the
amount of the debt has no bearing upon the question
when brought under consideration is, however, not un-
qualified, as there is an exception to be made in the event
of the amount of the debt being totally inadequate to
the amount of insurance involved. A case in point is
that of Guardian Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hogan,""
which holds that where the insurance procured is pal-
pably in excess of the amount the creditor stood to lose,
the contract will be construed to be a wagering contract
and void as being contrary to public policy.
While on the subject of the existence of an insurable
interest of a creditor in the life of a debtor, it is perti-
nent to consider the existence or non-existence of such
interest in joint obligors on a single obligation in the
lives of one another. The precise question has never
arisen in this jurisdiction, but where the question has
been decided, the authorities are unanimous in support
of the contention that an insurable interest does exist,
at least to the extent of the debt. It is probable Illinois
would follow these decisions, since joint obligors un-
37 Hubbard v. Stapp, 32 Il. App. 541.
38129 Ill. App. 626.
89 80 Ill. 35.
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doubtedly have a pecuniary interest in one another's
lives, which would be consistent with the general doctrine
already set forth.
As to the existence or non-existence of an insurable
interest in partnerships and corporations, and, where
such an interest does exist, as to the nature and scope
of such interest, unfortunately, the law in Illinois is
largely speculative, since up to the present time no cases
have been decided from which a definite and pertinent
doctrine may be established. However, the general
trend of the decisions in the cases cited in the preceding
pages, although dealing with the rights of individuals,
affords a firm and substantial basis from which certain
definite inferences may be drawn relating to the under-
lying doctrines to be applied in cases involving firms or
corporations. In the first place, all insurance contracts
in Illinois are considered as contracts of indemnity. This
is fundamental, and undeniably would apply to con-
tracts in favor of partnerships or corporations. From
this doctrine it may be deduced, therefore, that the
partnership or corporation asserting an insurable in-
terest must stand to sustain some loss through the death
of the person on whose life insurance is procured,
and consequently that such person must be capable of
performing services which are in a sense unique in char-
acter, that is, services of a nature which could not be
supplied immediately by some other person without a
measurable amount of loss or hardship resulting to the
employer. From this it would appear that a co-partner
or the several members of a partnership would have
an insurable interest in the life of any other partner,
and similarly, that a corporation would have an insurable
interest in the life of any officer, director or employee
who held his position by virtue of some special knowl-
edge or particular ability.
The existence of an insurable interest in firms and cor-
porations being established, the next question which
arises is that of the extent of such interest. Has a cor-
poration, for example, the right to procure insurance on
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the life of an employee in an unlimited amount, assum-
ing the corporation to have an insurable interest in the
life of such employee? To answer this question, con-
sideration must be given to the fundamental principles
of insurable interest which have already been estab-
lished, and to the nature of the relationship sustained by
the insured to the life insured. Following out this rea-
soning it appears that the contract is one to indemnify
the corporation for the loss which it will sustain should
the employee die, an indemnification for a specific loss
which is readily ascertainable-at least much more
capable of ascertainment than are numerous other life
insurance contracts that have been declared to be indem-
nity contracts. This being the case, it would logically
follow that the corporation should be limited in the
amount of insurance which might be obtained on the life
of an employee to an amount covering, but not exceed-
ing, the loss which might be sustained, and that any
violation of this limitation would make the contract a
wagering contract, contrary to public policy and void
at its inception.
Where a policy of insurance is taken out by a corpo-
ration on the life of some officer or director, the question
whether the corporation may pay premiums on the pol-
icy can only be determined by ascertaining whether the
act is ultra or infra vires of the corporation. If the act
is infra vires, the payment of premiums by the corpora-
tion will not void the contract, but the contrary is true
where the payment is ultra vires, because in Illinois an
ultra vires contract is absolutely void.40 While on the
subject of the payment of premiums by a corporation-
beneficiary, mention should be made of the recent case
of Wellhouse v. United Paper Co. et al.,41 which decided
that where a policy was acquired at the expense of a
corporation for the benefit of such corporation and all
premiums were paid by the corporation-beneficiary as
40Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 273 Ill. 332, following the rule
declared In Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co.,
139 U. S. 24.
4129 Fed. (2d) 886.
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such, the corporation became the owner of the policy
and the beneficiary of its provisions, including the right
to change beneficiary, so that the person insured could
not make a change of beneficiary of his own volition after
severing his connection with the corporation.
In general, then, it may be said that the doctrines
applicable to a corporate beneficiary are also applicable
to an individual employer who is named as beneficiary
in a policy issued under similar circumstances to those
treated above on the life of an employee.
Where a contract of life insurance is issued to a per-
son, in good faith, on his own life designating a specific
beneficiary, or to a beneficiary possessing the necessary
ifisurable interest in the life insured, the status of the
beneficiary depends entirely upon the terms of the policy,
construed according to the rules of construction and in-
terpretation applicable to such contracts, and the bene-
ficiary has no rights or privileges other than those spe-
cifically granted by the policy. Where the insured does
not reserve the right to make any subsequent change of
beneficiary, the beneficiary's interest vests immediately
upon the completion of the contract and the issuance of
the policy,42 and subsequently cannot be defeated except
with the beneficiary's consent.43 However, in the major-
ity of instances where policies are taken out by the
insured himself, he also reserves the right to make a
subsequent change of beneficiary, with the result that the
beneficiary's interest does not vest until the death of
the insured. A New York case held the beneficiary's
interest, when so vested, to be superior to that' of a
prior assignee of the insured to whom the policy was
assigned for the benefit of creditors, no subsequent
change of beneficiary being made.4" Where a beneficiary
under a life insurance policy predeceases the insured,
and the insured has reserved the right to make subse-
42 Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 Ill. 573; Begley v. Miller, 137 Il. App. 278.
43 Supreme Council of th& Royal Arcanum v. Tracy, 169 Ill. 123;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 212 Ill. 134.
44 Mahony v. Eaton, 205 N. Y. Supp. 707.
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quent changes of beneficiary, the proceeds automatically
revert to the insured's estate, there being nothing to the
contrary in the policy. 5
In certain cases involving benefit certificates where
the beneficiary has been merely described as "wife," a
situation has arisen through the death of the wife who
was living at the time the certificate in question was
issued, and the remarriage of the insured, where there
is a legal wife actually surviving the insured and yet
who was not the "wife" within the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made, no subsequent
change of beneficiary being executed to the second wife
as such. Under these circumstances the courts have held
that where no specific designation is made, the person
occupying the relationship stated at the time of the in-
sured's death is entitled to receive the proceeds of the
certificate. 8
Before leaving the subject of beneficiaries, there is
one other situation which should be discussed, that of
the effect of the death of both the insured and bene-
ficiary in a common disaster. In this state there is no
presumption of survivorship where persons die in a
common disaster, and in the absence of actual proof of
survivorship, no such presumption will attach to the
relationship of insured and beneficiary. Consequently in
a suit between different claimants arising out of the
demise of an insured and beneficiary in a common disas-
ter, the claimant upon whom the burden of proof falls,
must fail.4 7 The case supporting the doctrine just out-
lined is also authority for the rule that where a contin-
gent beneficiary was named in the insurance contract,
the burden would be upon such contingent beneficiary to
show that the insured survived the beneficiary and,
therefore, that the right to the proceeds vested in the
contingent beneficiary upon the insured's death. The
45 Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 IMi. 573.
46Modern Woodman v. Allin, 301 Il1. 119; Pike County Mut. Life
Ass'n v. Berry, 214 I1. App. 316.
47 Mlddeke v. Balder, 198 IlM. 590.
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case is clearly in accord with the Illinois doctrine with
regard to survivorship and with the established rules of
the doctrine of insurable interest and logically should
be followed without hesitation in any future cases which
might arise involving a similar state of facts.
The case of Wellhouse v. United Paper Co. et al.48
attracts attention to the rights of the insured under a
policy of life insurance to make changes of beneficiary.
This case is one involving a policy of life insurance pro-
cured by the defendant upon the life of one Wellhouse,
an officer of the corporation, the defendant being named
as beneficiary, and the policy containing the usual clause
reserving the right to change beneficiary to the insured
alone. Subsequently the insured severed his connection
with the corporation and executed a change of beneficiary
to his wife, and upon his death both the wife and the
corporation claimed the right to receive the proceeds. As
this is a very recent case, decided January 7, 1929, the
decision of the court is of particular interest and is there-
fore quoted verbatim:
The insurance having been acquired at the expense and for the
benefit of the paper company, that company was the owner of
the policy and the beneficiary of its provisions, including the
one as* to changing the beneficiary. Whatever rights or privi-
leges the insured had under the terms of the policy, he held in
trust for the party from whom the consideration proceeded.
The policy as a whole was an asset of the paper company. Noth-
ing in the evidence as to the circumstance attending the issue
of the policy furnishes any support for the contention that
Alvin Wellhouse, before or after he ceased to have any connec-
tion with the paper company, had the right to change the
beneficiary without the consent of the paper company. We con-
clude that he did not have that right, and that the court did
not err in making the above mentioned ruling.
As a general rule it may be stated that in policies
issued by fraternal benefit associations the insured has
the right to change the beneficiary at any time when
4829 Fed. (2d) 886.
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such a procedure might seem advisable to him, providing,
of course, that the new beneficiary comes within a class
designated in the contract as being eligible to become a
beneficiary. However, this is not the rule with regard
to insurance policies issued by standard insurance com-
panies, the insured having the right to change beneficiary
under these contracts only when such right is specifically
reserved to him by the terms of the policy, and then
only after a substantial compliance has been made with
those terms.49 In this connection it has been held that
where the terms of a policy specify that a change of bene-
ficiary may only be effected upon written application to
the insurer and a subsequent endorsement of the change
upon the policy itself at the home office of the insurer,
the insured cannot make a change of beneficiary there-
under, except by proper application and endorsement.50
The case of Freund v. Freund, which is authority for the
preceding statement, is also authority for the rule that
where the consent of the insurer is required by the terms
of the contract, a court of equity cannot treat a change
of beneficiary as completed where the insured's death
occurs before consent is given by the insurer and an
endorsement made upon the policy. It is interesting to
note that the Federal cases bearing on this same particu-
lar topic deviate somewhat from the rule as laid down
in the case of Freund v. Freund, as it has been held in
the Federal courts that the provisions of a policy pro-
viding for the effectiveness of a change of beneficiary
only upon endorsement upon the contract of insurance is
for the protection of the insurer alone, and that conse-
quently, where a valid written request for change of bene-
ficiary has been made to the insurer, it is the insurer's
duty to endorse the change upon the policy.51 Similarly,
the Federal court has held that where the insured has
complied with all the conditions of the policy and has
done everything within his power to accomplish the de-
sired change, a court of equity will treat that as done
49 Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278.
50 Freund v. Freund, 218 Ill. 189.
51 Navassa Guano Co. v. Cockfleld, 244 Fed. 222.
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which ought to be done and declare the change of bene-
ficiary effective. 52
The question of a non-compliance with the terms of a
policy with reference to a change of beneficiary, may be
raised only by the insurer as a general rule, with the
possible exception of a case involving an insurance con-
tract in which the beneficiary has a vested interest, where
the question might properly be raised by the beneficiary
as well as the insurer.53 As the insurer has the right
to raise a question of non-compliance, so also the insurer
may waive any stipulation contained in a policy, per-
taining to a change of beneficiary, providing however
that the existing beneficiary does not have a vested
interest in such policy.54 Where the insured has specifi-
cally reserved to himself the right to make any subse-
quent change of beneficiary, it is obvious that the
beneficiary's interest is neither vested nor indefeasible
during the insured's lifetime, and consequently such
interest as he has may be divested by the insured with
the consent of the insurer alone and upon such conditions
as the insurer may require, within the specifications of
the contract, the beneficiary not being entitled to notice
of any change which may be made in this manner.55
Where a change of beneficiary has been secured upon
a policy of life insurance by the fraudulent act of the
new beneficiary, it is a general rule among the several
states that the rights of the original beneficiary cannot
be so cut off, 5, although there is a California case holding
that the original beneficiary cannot contest the change
of beneficiary where the validity of the contract is not
attacked by the insurer.57 The rule in Illinois is clearly
stated in the case of Cellarius v. Junker,58 which holds
that the original beneficiary may set aside a change of
52 Reid v. Durboraw, 272 Fed. 99.
53 Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 387.
54 Delaney v. Delaney, 175 Ill. 187; Ptacek v. Pisa, 134 Ill. App. 155.
55 Reid v. Durboraw, 272 Fed. 99.
56 Mitchell v. Langley, 143 Ga. 827.
57 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 46 Cal. App. 203.
58200 Ill. App. 399.
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beneficiary on the grounds of fraud, undue influence and
mental incompetency, and enjoin the payment of the
proceeds to the new beneficiary, by bringing suit in
equity.
There is one further matter with regard to the right
to make a change of beneficiary which has been decided
by the courts of this state, and which should receive
attention at this time. This is the doctrine advanced in
the case of Bruce et al. v. Illinois Bankers Life Asso-
ciation,59 which holds that where a change of beneficiary
is made under a life insurance policy to persons having
an insurable interest, and such change is attacked by
prior beneficiaries on the ground of mental incapacity of
the insured, the question of mental capacity is one of
fact and should be submitted to the jury for determi-
nation.
The case of Bruce v. Illinois Bankers Life Association
has opened up another phase of the law of insurable
interest which it is now appropriate to consider, namely,
the various questions of procedure that have been de-
termined by our courts in the adjudication of the existing
cases.
First of all, it should be understood that the question
of insurable interest is a question of fact" and that the
question may be raised ordinarily only by the insurer.6 1
These two principles are supported by such an abundance
of authority both within and outside of this state as to
require no further comment. Secondly, any question
involving the doctrine of insurable interest must be
raised in the nisi prius court and comes too late when
raised for the first time in the Appellate Court upon
review. 2
The much cited case of Guardian Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company v. Hogan,68 is also authority for two
59 207 ni. App. 555.
60 Bruce et al. v. Illinois Bankers Life Association, 207 Il1. App. 555.
61 Johnson v. Van Epps, 110 I1. 551; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Haxtun, 129 Ill. App. 626.
62 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Quandt, 69 Ill. App. 649.
63 80 Ill. 35.
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doctrines governing the procedure to be observed in cases
of this nature which it is well to have in mind. The first
of these doctrines holds that an insurable interest need
only be pleaded in a case where the policy was taken out
by one claiming to have an insurable interest. The
second is to the effect that facts tending to prove an
insurable interest which have come to light in the course
of a trial should not be declared by the court to consti-
tute such an interest. Before leaving this case, some
attention should be drawn to an instruction which was
requested by the defendant and refused by the court,
reading as follows:
You are further instructed that, though a party may have
some insurable interest in the life of another, as creditor or
otherwise, yet, if the amount of insurance procured upon such
life appears palpably to be very largely in excess of any possible
loss the assured can suffer from the death of the insured, then
the presumption of a gambling or wager insurance arises, which
calls upon the assured to show that such insurance was not
procured as a mere cover for gambling, or a wager upon the
life of the insured; and, in this case, if you believe from the
evidence, that the plaintiff had some interest of an insurable
character, as already defined, in his father's life, at the date
of his several applications for insurance, yet, if you find, from
the evidence, that the amount procured was vastly dispropor-
tionate in its excess to any probable loss which Patrick might
suffer from his father's death, such circumstance has a tendency
to prove that the insurance was procured for mere purposes of
speculation, and as a cover for gambling, and if, from the evi-
dence, you shall find that such was the fact, then the plaintiff
cannot recover in this action.
The Supreme Court held that this instruction should
have been given and that to refuse it was error.
A discussion of the application of the doctrine of in-
surable interest to life insurance in this state would not
be complete without some reference to the legal conse-
quences of the cessation or diminution of such insurable
interest. The present doctrine regarding cessation and
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diminution of insurable interest may be traced back to
the third section of the English Statute, 14 Geo. III, c.
48, enacted in 1774, which was originally susceptible of
two interpretations, 64 the first holding that no greater
amount could be recovered than the value of the interest
at the time the policy was issued, and the second that
the amount recoverable should be determined according
to the value of the interest at the time the policy became
a claim. This latter interpretation was originally pre-
ferred to the former on the authority of the case of
Godsall v. Boldero,65 but that case has since been over-
ruled by the case of Dalby v. The India and London Life
Assurance Company,66 and the former interpretation of
the statute established as the controlling doctrine.
From an examination of authorities it appears that
the greater weight today is with the Dalby case and that
the Illinois doctrine is in accord with the weight of
authority, although there is no specific Illinois case which
can be cited to prove this contention.
The great majority of cases, in which a cessation or
diminution of interest becomes material today are those
involving divorce, and in regard to the question raised
in such cases the Illinois doctrine is clearly established
by the case of Begly v. Miller,67 which provides that "the
decree of divorce in no way affected the rights of the
divorced wife in the policy as the beneficiary named in
it, or her authority to demand and receive the amount
payable in virtue of its terms." The inference to be
drawn from this case is that it is obvious, that to be
consistent with Begley v. Miller, the Illinois courts must
adhere to the doctrine established by the case of Dalby
v. The India and London Life Assurance Company, and
follow the general rule holding that where an insurable
interest is present at the time the policy is issued, such
interest is not affected by a subsequent cessation or dim-
inution thereof.
64 C. J. Bunyon, The Law of Life Assurance (2nd Ed.), pp. 21-22.
65 9 East 72.
66 15 C. B. 365.
67137 I1. App. 278.
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In discussing this question of cessation or diminution
of interest and the cases establishing the controlling
doctrine, one cannot help but be impressed by the fact
that here too, as was found in discussing the various
other phases of the main subject, the old established doc-
trines of the common law have withstood the triumphal
march of progress which has cast down the cherished
theories of contemporary sciences, and one pauses to
admire and do homage to the old masters whose genius
and ability first gave these principles to the law.
